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NOTES

PREEMPTION REVISITED: TITLE VII
AND STATE TORT LIABILITY AFTER
INTERNATIONAL UNION v. JOHNSON
CONTROLS
In their efforts to "umpire the relations between the states
and the federal government," 1 courts have wrestled with the doctrine of preemption 2 since Gibbons v. Ogden.' Preemption deciI Kenneth

L. Hirsh, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption,1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515,

515.
2 The doctrine of preemption is based on the supremacy of the Federal Constitution
and its laws as indicated in the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
At its most basic level, the doctrine requires federal law to override state law wherever
the federal law has "occupied the field" or the laws conflict. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 311-12 (4th ed. 1991). Preemption decisions are
questions of statutory interpretation requiring the court to determine the congressional in-

tent regarding preemption. See LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 6-25,

at 480-81 (2d ed. 1988); see also infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (discussing preemption standards).
Preemption questions arise frequently where the commerce power is concerned and
have also covered varied fields. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 9.1, at 312; see also Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (preemptive effect of federal cigarette labelling
laws); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 401 (1988) (Labor Management Relations Act and preemption of state retaliatory discharge claim); California Fed.
Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 274-75 (1987) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act
and preemption of state fair employment statute); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 241 (1984) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission and preemption of state tort claim for
punitive damages); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 (1980) (federal revenue system and preemption of state taxes on commerce).
3 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons is the landmark case in which the Supreme
Court invalidated a New York statute that granted an individual a monopoly to use navigable waters within the State. Id. at 221. The Court found that this law contradicted the
power granted to Congress to regulate commerce and to issue licenses to those individuals
they determine are permitted to navigate the waters. Id. In denying enforcement of the
conflicting state law, the Court maintained that the framers' intent was for the Constitution
and its law to prevail. Id. "The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is
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sions involve the resolution of conflicts between federal and state
law.4 Although general principles have been developed by the
courts to provide a basis for preemption determinations,5 these
standards are difficult to apply6 and increasingly require a case-bycase analysis.7 Employment discrimination under Title VII of the
produced by the declaration, that the constitution is the supreme law." Id. at 210-211.
Scholars have noted the import of Gibbons. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 2, § 6-25, at 479
(Gibbons recognized hierarchy of Federal System); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 515 (noting Gibbons was first significant case in which the Court ordered relations between state and federal government). The Court in Gibbons believed it was merely declaring what were clearly
established principles. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 222. "The conclusion... depends on a chain of
principles . . . thought nearly self-evident, [but] the magnitude of the question . . . demanded that we should assume nothing." Id. The issue of preemption, however, has remained a significant one; its continuing importance probably would have surprised the
framers of the Constitution. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 515.
' See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 515; see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., 1 TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 623 (1986) (introduction to federal preemption).
5 See ROTUNDA ET AL., supra, note 4, § 12.1, at 624. Commonly cited standards for
determining preemption include: whether the state statute "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), and whether both regulations can be enforced without
impairing the federal superintendence of the field," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Other tests indicate that state law will only be preempted
when the congressional intent is unmistakably clear, id., or the "scheme of the federal regulation [is] so pervasive... that Congress left no room for the [state] to supplement it," Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). However, when the field allegedly
preempted is one which has traditionally been occupied by the states, the powers of the
state will not be disturbed unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. See Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
These standards are categorized as broad or specific. See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 522. If
a test is specific to a particular field, courts are likely to exaggerate fine details between
state and federal laws to find (or not find) a conflict. Id. Similarly, if a standard is broad
enough to apply to all preemption decisions, it will likely be of little value in a specific
situation. Id.
0 See ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 4, § 12.1, at 624. "There is no simplistic constitutional standard for defining preemption parameters." Id. Most preemption questions fall
somewhere in the middle of the clear standards. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 520. Justice Black
aptly remarked that "[n]one of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or
an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula." Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. One commentator has noted that there
are essentially three obstacles which prevent preemption decisions from being easily resolved: (i) the relationship between state and federal law ranges from conflict to irrelevancy,
(ii) decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, and -(iii) a wide diversity of laws is involved.
Hirsch, supra note 1, at 553. Other scholars have attributed the difficulty to the "diversity
and complexity" of preemption questions. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.1, at 312.
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.1, at 312. Preemption decisions are particularly fact sensitive because two sets of laws and policies are being weighed against each
other. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 521. Each case presents unique problems of statutory interpretation, and rationales in one area are not easily applied to another area. See Daryl R.
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Civil Rights Act of 19648 ("Title VII") is one area in which the
preemption question has not been easily resolved. 9
In International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,10 the Supreme Court recently held that a corporate fetal protection policy"
that excluded fertile women from working in a battery factory,
where they would be exposed to high levels of lead, was a violation
of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 2 However,
Hague, Note, New Federalismand "Occupation of the Field": Failing to Maintain State
Constitutional Protections Within a Preemption Framework, 64 WASH. L. REv. 721, 723
(1989); see also ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 4, § 12.1, at 629 (noting preemption decisions
focus on specifics of particular statutes). A preemption question involves a judicial balancing
of the relevant state and federal interests involved with each conflicting legislation. NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.1, at 312.
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e (1988). The general purpose of Title VII is to "achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of... employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
9 See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (holding
California statute requiring employers to provide female employees with pregnancy leave
and reinstatement not preempted by Title VII).
Courts that have determined the preemptive reach of Title VII have generally only
considered supplemental state anti-discrimination laws. See,e.g., Butler v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 617 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Miss. 1985) (concluding state law covering maternity insurance benefits not preempted by Title VII); Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg
Found., 574 F. Supp. 318, 321 (E.D. Va. 1983) (holding contract claim for wrongful discharge not preempted by Title VII). Therefore, the effect of Title VII on state law that is
not premised on fair employment practices, and only remotely impacts on Title VII, remains
to be clarified by the courts or Congress.
10 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).

11 See id. at 1207. A fetal protection policy, also known as a fetal vulnerability policy,
excludes fertile women from employment positions that involve exposure to hazardous substances that may cause fetal injuries. See Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal
Vulnerability Policies,53 U. CHL L. REV. 1219, 1226 (1986). These policies are instituted by
employers based on scientific evidence which purportedly indicates the hazardous effects of
toxic exposure to fetuses. See Pendleton Elizabeth Hamlet, Note, Fetal ProtectionPolicies:
A Statutory Proposal in the Wake of International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc.,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 1110, 1122 (1990). Based on this evidence, an increasing number of
companies have enacted fetal protection policies to shield themselves from the possibility of
tort liability by children injured in utero. Id. at 1124. In 1980, it was estimated that 100,000
jobs excluded fertile women from employment based on these policies and the number may
have reached into the millions. See Emily Buss, Getting Beyond Discrimination:A Regulatory Solution to the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577, 578-79
& n.8 (1986).
12 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209-10. The Court rejected Johnson Control's argument that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification which relieved Johnson Controls of
compliance with Title VII's mandates. Id. at 1207. The Court reasoned that Congress' intent
was for an employer to evaluate a woman based only on her abilities. Id.
Our holding today that Title VII... forbids sex-specific fetal-protection policies is
neither remarkable nor unprecedented ....

We do no more than hold that the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act means what it says. It is no more appropriate for
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the Court did not determine whether state tort actions brought by
children injured in utero, as a result of their working mothers' exposure to hazardous substances, would be preempted by Title
VII.13 While the Johnson Controls decision makes it "clear that
14
sex discrimination is not a legal solution to workplace hazards,
the Court left the preemption question unanswered in stating that
"[w]hen it is impossible for an employer to comply with both state
[tort law] and federal [Title VII] requirements,... federal law preempts that of the States."' 5 The extent of this preemption remains
unclear1 6 and until the question is resolved, workers, employers,
and courts will continue to struggle with the issue of liability for
fetal injuries to children of women exposed to hazardous work areas during pregnancy.
This Note will analyze the preemption of state tort claims by
Title VII where an employer is prohibited from implementing a
fetal protection policy in a hazardous work site and conclude that
there should be no preemption of state tort actions against the employer. Part One will discuss the doctrine of preemption, focusing
on the methods and standards employed by courts in preemption
decisions. Part Two will examine the purposes of Title VII and
state tort law according to these preemption guidelines and conclude that there is no conflict warranting preemption. Finally, Part
Three will advance the policies supporting this conclusion and offer alternative solutions to workplace injury liability.
for ... employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive
role is more important to herself ... than her economic role.
the courts than ...
Id. at 1210.
13 See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. "Because Johnson Controls has not argued
that it faces any costs from tort liability... the preemption question is not before us." Id.
" Jill Smolowe, Weighing Some Heavy Metal, TImE, April 1, 1991, at 60.

15 See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. The Court inferred that if state tort law
was found to inhibit Title VII's objectives, it would be preempted and noted that the concurrence's preemption concerns were remote. Id. at 1208. In his concurrence, Justice White
noted the import of the issue of preemption of state tort liability. See id. at 1211 (White, J.,
concurring). He stated that "[w]arnings ... will not preclude claims by injured children
because the general rule is that parents cannot waive causes of action on behalf of their
children, and the parents' negligence will not be imputed to the children." Id. Indeed, the
concurrence admonished the Court for dismissing the preemption question and indicated, as
this note will argue, that tort actions would probably not be preempted. Id.
" See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1211 (White, J., concurring). "[I]t is far from
clear that compliance with Title VII will pre-empt state tort liability." Id.
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I. PREEMPTION DOCTRINE GENERALLY

The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause
of the Federal Constitution." Basically, it holds that where a state
law conflicts with a federal law, the federal law prevails.18 Congressional intent to preempt an area of state law may be express or
implied.' Where the intent is implied, there are essentially two
grounds on which state law may be preempted.20 First, the federal
law may "occupy the field," thus precluding state legislation in
that area, whether or not a conflict exists.21 Discerning congressional intent to occupy an area is a question of statutory interpretation 22 based on an examination of the pervasiveness of the federal statute. 3 Second, a state law will be preempted if it conflicts
with a federal law or interferes with its purpose.24 In this respect,
the state law will be invalidated where it is "impossible to comply"
17 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
,8 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824).
19 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.4, at 314.
20 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). Preemption can occur
in two ways: where the federal law occupies the field and where the state law conflicts. See
id. Some commentators state that there are three ways in which a federal law may preempt
a state law: occupying the field, conflict and interference. See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 526.
21 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. The intent of Congress to occupy the field may be
expressly stated or implicitly found. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982). Preemption will be inferred where an "Act of Congress... touch[es] a field
in which the federal interest is so dominant... [it] will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
22 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 6-25, at 480. It is for the courts to determine congressional
intent when the legislature has not made it clear. See NowAK & ROTUNDA supra note 2, §
9.1, at 311. When Congress fails to articulate, courts may invalidate or uphold state laws
until Congress articulates itself. Id.
23 See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The pervasiveness of a statute may "make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Id.
The field Congress is said to occupy, however, must not be interpreted too broadly so as
to preempt more state law than necessary. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79
(1941) (Stone, J., dissenting). Thus, boundaries of the area occupied must be carefully delimited. Id. This narrowing of the field appears to represent the approach adopted by the
modem Court. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1983) (Atomic Energy Act primarily concerned with
safety requirements of nuclear facilities; state statute motivated by economic concerns
which did not fall into occupied field of safety); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69,
86 (1987) (Williams Act did not preempt state law restricting corporate takeovers).
24 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
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with both state and federal requirements 25 or where the state law
frustrates the objective of the federal law.26
Through the process of "statutory interpretation, 2 7 courts are
able to shape preemption policy.2 8 Despite this power modern

courts have been reluctant to invalidate state statutes in the absence of a clear legislative intent.29 When the federal statute is am-

biguous,30 courts weigh numerous factors and require exacting evidence before finding legislative intent to preempt state law.31 For
25 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).

Where compliance with both regulations is impossible, the court is not required to examine
congressional intent prior to a determination that federal law will prevail. Id. at 142-43.
2 See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. The court's role is to review the two sets of legislation and
determine whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id.
27 See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1989); see also
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) (determining preemption requires court
to "ascertain Congress' intent in enacting federal statute at issue"). "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
"The critical question . . . is always whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law." Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 476
U.S. 355, 369 (1986); see also ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 4, § 12.1, at 624 (noting judiciary
charged with determining and following congressional intent in preemption decisions).
28 See Note, Preemption as a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REV. 208, 224 (1959). "Preemption can never be the product of statutory construction alone since the Court and only the Court can make the final judgment of incompatibility required by the supremacy clause." Id. at 224; see also Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 531-33 (1947) (recognizing that
judges have broad area of "free judicial movement" in construing statutes).
The expansive power of the court to decide preemption questions and frame preemption policy is not, however, without its critics. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 6-29, at 510
("[P]reemption analysis ... should be a matter of statutory construction rather than freeform judicial policymaking."); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 558 (proposing new analytical framework to encourage court to establish legitimate limits on policymaking role).
29 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.4, at 314-15; see also Ronald D. Rotunda,
Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, in 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 311, 312 (1988)
(noting trend is to move away from preemption).
30 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). To
conclude that federal regulations preempt state regulatory powers, Congress' intent must be
unmistakable or the nature of the subject matter must permit no other conclusion. Id.; see
also New York Dep't of Social Servs v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (requiring a "clear
manifestation of intent" to preempt).
31 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). In Rice, the
Court was asked to determine whether the United States Warehouse Act superseded the
authority of the Illinois Commerce Commission to regulate public grain and other warehouses. Id. at 222. To reach its conclusion, the opinion articulated a number of factors to be
considered, including: whether Congress had legislated in an area traditionally reserved for
the states; whether traditional state police powers would be preempted in the absence of a
clear and obvious purpose of Congress; whether the federal scheme was so pervasive as to
offer no opportunity for supplemental state legislation; whether federal interest was domi-
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example, if the area of regulation is one traditionally reserved for
the states, courts may be inclined to conclude there is no preemption.2 By contrast, if the subject matter is one which necessarily
requires national uniformity, courts will likely favor preemption.'3
In sum, the process involves a kind of "judicial ad hoc balancing"
of competing interests, 3 4 resulting in preemption decisions in which
35
outcomes are policy driven and fact specific.

II.

ANALYSIS OF TITLE

VIrs

PREEMPTIVE EFFECT

Each preemption question "presents unique problems of congressional intent and statutory construction; pre-emption rationales in one area do not translate easily to another. "' 36 The question presented by Johnson Controls is whether Congress intended
that Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"), should preempt state tort actions brought by female employees' offspring injured as a result of an employer's hazardous
worksite
Although the broad scope of Title VII may imply an intent to
nant in the regulated area; whether state and federal laws sought the same goal; and
whether state law has an incompatible result with federal law. Id. at 230; see also Hirsch,
supra note 1, at 549. ("noting considerations cannot be applied mechanically," nor is any
one determinative in resolving a preemption question).
"2 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resource Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983)
(upholding state's right to assess needs for nuclear facilities); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (state tort claims not preempted by federal nuclear regulatory scheme).
Pacific Gas involved a California state moratorium on the construction of nuclear
plants and a state's right to assess local needs. Id. at 194. The Court held that this law,
traditionally the domain of the states, was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act which
was concerned with safety aspects of nuclear facilities. Id. at 216. The Act did not require
that states build nuclear plants, however, it regulated safety standards once a plant was in
operation. Id. at 205.
In Silkwood, the Court allowed a plaintiff to recover punitive damages in a tort action
against her employer notwithstanding the Atomic Energy Act and its control of safety regulations. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256. The Court recognized a state's right to provide for the
compensation of those injured by the tortious conduct of others. Id. at 251.
'3 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1956) (stating that alien registration is area affecting foreign relations and requires national action.); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (concluding Federal Meat Inspection Act preempted
certain state labelling laws).
31See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.1, at 312.
35See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 520-21 (despite clearly articulated standards, courts
must focus on specific circumstances to resolve preemption questions).
" Hague, supra note 7, at 723.
3' See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
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preempt state tort actions,"' Congress expressly disavowed any
broad preemptive effect by enacting specific "savings" clauses39
which expressly validate state laws to the extent they do not conflict with Title VII's purpose and effect.4 ° Therefore, Title VII will
preempt state tort actions only if it is impossible for the employer
to comport simultaneously with Title VII's requirements and state
tort liability standards 41 or if the objectives of the two laws conflict.42 Resolution of this preemption question involves an analysis
of Title VII and state tort law and their underlying objectives to
determine if a conflict exists.4"
A.

Title VII-History and Purpose

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196444 was enacted to create equal employment opportunities by removing barriers that
have historically favored one class of employees over another. 45 For
women, this meant an end to protectionist legislation which had
See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
& ROTUNDA supra note 2, § 9.1, at 311. "Savings clauses" are a way in
which Congress can expressly preserve concurrent state legislation. Id. In contrast, preemption clauses indicate Congressional intent to invalidate state laws in the same area. Id. However, one commentator has cautioned against literal application of savings or preemption
clauses because Congress cannot foresee all possible situations that will arise. See Hirsch,
supra note 1, at 540.
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988) ("Effect on State laws"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988)
("Construction of provisions not to exclude operation of State laws and not to invalidate
consistent State laws").
The specific "savings clause" in Title VII provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of
any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
"4 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
("[F]ederal exclusion of state law is inescapable... where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility.").
42 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (stating test is not
whether federal government occupies field of safety but whether state law irreconcilably
conflicts or frustrates objectives of federal law).
"' See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 9.1, at 312; see also Hirsch, supra note 1, at
38

39 See NOWAK

534. Only after a full examination of the purpose and intent of each law can one proceed
with any analysis of the relation between the two laws according to preemption doctrine. Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
4 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); see also Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) ("Congress intended to prohibit all [employment practices which discriminate] on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.").
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been upheld in the early 1900s based on a societal interest in preserving the traditional role of women as mothers. 46 However, the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Title VII in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert,47 reaffirming the view of women as marginal
workers, 48 prompted Congress to enact the PDA in 1978. 4' The

PDA expressly defines discrimination based on pregnancy as sex
discrimination. 0 Its objective is to "guarantee women the basic
right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family
life.

' 51

In the late 1970s, however, many companies, like Johnson

Controls,5 2 instituted restrictive fetal protection policies which excluded women from positions involving excessive exposure to hazardous substances which posed a risk to unborn children.5 3 Courts
again regressed to the protectionist era by upholding these exclusionary policies 54 under the guise of protecting future genera4'See

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417 (1908). In Muller, the Supreme Court upheld

an Oregon state statute that prohibited women, but not men, from working more than 10
hours per day in factories or laundries within the state. Id. The Court found the restriction
justified by society's legitimate concern with the protection and well-being of women. Id.;
see Becker, supra note 11, at 1221-23.
4'429 U.S. 125 (1976).
48 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert, the Court upheld an
employer's disability insurance plan which excluded pregnancy coverage, id. at 145-46, and
refused to acknowledge that discrimination based on pregnancy was sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, id. at 136.
4'See HOUSE COMM'N ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
BAsED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 (PDA enacted to reverse Court's decision in Gilbert).
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. The Act provides in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ....as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.
Id.
61 123 CONG. REc. S29658 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams) (cited in California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1989)).
82 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
53Id.; see also Becker, supra note 11, at 1226.
See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 893 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd sub
nom, International Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991) (upholding fetal protection policy on theory of business necessity); see also Hays v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726
F.2d 1543, 1552-53 & n.15 (l1th Cir. 1984) (enunciating 3-part test which would uphold fetal
protection policies as business necessities); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189-90

(4th Cir. 1982) (enlarging business necessity defense to uphold exclusionary policies in
proper circumstances).
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tions5 The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls was a
tremendous vindication of the rights of working women which reaffirmed the goals of Title VII and 56
the PDA by permitting women to
have their jobs and families, too.

B. State Tort Law-Goals and Purpose
Tort law is based on a state's concern for compensating victims of injury.5 7 Where an employer's negligence in failing to adequately maintain a safe work environment or failure to properly
warn employees of known hazards results in injury to an individual, the employer will be liable in tort.5 Moreover, most states
permit a child injured in utero to assert an action against the party
responsible for the injury.5
Traditionally the domain of the states, tort law has been accorded great deference by the courts in the absence of a clear congressional intent to preempt.60 In English v. General Electric Co.,"'
65 See Becker, supra note 11, at 1229. Although based primarily on a concern for unborn children, fetal protection policies have the same detrimental effects as traditional sex
protective laws. Id. at 1220-21. Such policies reinforce the view of women as reproductive
entities, limit women's employment opportunities and intensify the view that women are
not capable of making decisions regarding their future. Id. at 1231-35; see also Wendy W.
Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection
with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641, 653 (1981) (discussing stereotyped role of women).
The historical reduction of women's role in life to a single dimension-vessel and
nurturer for the next generation-resulted in the sacrifice of tremendous human
diversity of talent, predilection, and personal aspiration. To the extent restrictions
are imposed today upon the normal, routine choices about women's work and nonwork lifestyles, such historical limitations upon women's lives are reimposed.
Id.
56See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1210; see also The Supreme Court, 1990
Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 379-89 (1991) (discussing import of Johnson
Controls decision) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. The Johnson Controls decision was an important step in halting gender segregation in the work force. Id.
57 See Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238
(1944) ("purpose of the law of torts is to ... afford compensation for injuries sustained by
one person as the result of the conduct of another"); see also W. PAGE KEzrON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6-7 (5th ed. 1984) (noting law of torts consists
of allocation of losses).
58 KEETON ET AL., supra note 57, § 71, at 510-11.
See Deborah M. Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 22
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 754-56 (1988) (listing states that permit causes of action for prenatal injuries).
60 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983); English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2277 (1990); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1984).
59
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the Supreme Court exemplified this deference in holding that a
state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
not preempted by the whistleblower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act ("ERA"). 2 The Court reasoned that the tort action,
unlike the ERA, was not based on a concern for safety, but on providing a remedy for persons who suffer intentional injury, and thus
was not within the field Congress intended to preempt.6 3 Similarly,

the compensatory aim of tort law differs from the anti-discriminasupporting the conclusion that pretion goals of Title VH, further
6 4
emption is unwarranted.

C.

Conflict or Interference

Title VII expressly precludes preemption of state law "other
than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of
any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under
[Title VII]." 65 The Supreme Court recently stated in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.66 that when Congress expressly addresses the
preemptive effect of a statute, a court's task is to "fairly but-in
light of the strong presumption against pre-emption-narrowly
61 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
2 Id. at 2281. In English, a laboratory technician at a nuclear power plant, operated by

respondent, repeatedly complained to management about violations of nuclear safety standards at the facility, including "failure of her co-workers to clean up radioactive spills." Id.
at 2273. When she received no response, she deliberately failed to clean contaminants from
the work site, outlined the contaminated areas with tape, and brought the spill to her supervisor's attention when the work site was still not cleaned several days later. Id. Petitioner
was later fired for knowing failure to clean her contaminated work area. Id. After petitioner's initial suit charging retaliatory discharge in violation of the ERA "whistle blower"
provision was dismissed on procedural grounds, id. at 2274, petitioner commenced a diversity action, stating a claim under North Carolina law for intentional infliction of emotional
distress alleging severe depression resulting from respondent's "extreme and outrageous"
conduct, id.
63 Id. at 2278 (noting effect of state tort law on decisions concerning radiological safety
not sufficiently direct or substantial to place claim in preempted field).
" See id. at 2278; see also Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256. Given the results in Silkwood and
English, it would seem inconsistent to deem state tort law within the field preempted by
Title VII since the relation and effect is even more remote than the effect of the state law on
the federal nuclear safety regulations implicated in Silkwood and federal whistle-blower
laws implicated in English.
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988). The complete provision states:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of
any State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing
of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title.
66 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
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construe the precise language of [the pre-emption clause] and...
look to each ... common law claim[] to determine if it is in fact
preempted. 6 7 Under this narrow reading, the language of Title
VII's "savings clause" arguably resolves the preemption issue
presented by Johnson Controls68 in that state tort law does not
require an employer to engage in unlawful employment practices.6 9
The import of Title VII's anti-preemption provision was examined in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra,7 0 in which the Supreme Court held that a California statute7 1 requiring employers to provide pregnancy leave and rein17

Id. at 2621. In Cipollone, an action was brought against several cigarette manufactur-

ers by a smoker who had contracted lung cancer. Id. at 2613. After the plaintiff's death, the
estate of the decedent continued the action asserting several grounds for recovery including
strict liability, negligence and intentional tort. Id. at 2614. The defendants argued that the
federal statute, which required the defendants to put a warning label on the cigarette packages, preempted any common law tort liability. Id. The Court rejected the argument except
as to the duty to warn claim. Id. at 2625.
8 See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 295-96 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring). Applying the plain meaning of the statute in California Federal, Justice
Scalia admonished the Court for analyzing the purpose and effect of the PDA when all that
was necessary was an application of the language of the provision. Id. at 296. "No more is
needed to decide this case." Id. For a similar view, see TRIBE, supra note 2, § 6-26, at 482,
n.8. Tribe argues that an examination of underlying objectives is improper where the language of such an anti-preemption provision purports to resolve the question. Id. Tribe and
Scalia approve of the result in California Federal, but not the approach followed by the
Court. Id.
69 See CaliforniaFed., 479 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The
law at issue "does not remotely purport to require or permit any refusal to accord federally
mandated equal treatment to others similarly situated." Id. at 296; see also TRIBE, supra
note 2, §§ 6-26, at 482-83 n.8 (discussing scope of anti-preemption provision). The provision
restricts its own preemptive effect. Id. at 483 n.8. It only preempts those state laws that
require or permit violations of Title VII. Id.
70 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987).
' CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). The statute provides in relevant
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification:
(b) For an employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions ....
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of
time; provided, the period shall not exceed four months.... Reasonable
period of time means that period during which the female employee is
disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.
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statement was not preempted by Title VII.7 2 The Court examined
the purpose and history of the PDA7 3 and concluded that there
was no conflict warranting preemption.7 4 The Court reasoned that
the state law supplemented the federal objectives and expanded
the protection of the PDA. 75 Furthermore, the Court determined
that the California statute did not require any act that would be
unlawful under the PDA.7 6 Similarly, it is suggested that there is
no conflict between Title VII and state tort law77 because it is not
physically or legally impossible for an employer like Johnson Controls to comply simultaneously with Title VII's mandates and state

tort liability standards. 8 Moreover, if "the employer fully informs
the woman of the risk, and.., has not acted negligently, the basis
for holding an employer liable seems remote at best. '7 9 It is thus
72 CaliforniaFed., 479 U.S. at 292. The Court reasoned that a finding of preemption

was not warranted because the state statute did not have a purpose inconsistent with Title
VII nor was it physically impossible to comply with both the state statute and Title VII. Id.
71 See id. at 283-84.
74 Id.

11 Id. at 288-89. In fact, the Court recognized that the two statutes "share a common
goal." Id. at 288. Consistent with the goal of the PDA, the California statute sought to
achieve equal employment opportunities for pregnant women by requiring their reinstatement after pregnancy leave. Id. at 289. The objects did not conflict and, further, compliance
with both was not an impossibility. Id. at 290-91.
76 Id. at 283-84. The California statute did not require employers to treat pregnant
employees better than other disabled employees, only to treat them similarly. Id. at 291.
The PDA was intended to be a minimum level of protection. Id. at 285. Congress was aware,
when it enacted the PDA, that states like California had statutes which provided for greater
protection for pregnant employees and it conveyed no "clear and manifest" purpose to preempt such statutes. Id. at 287-88. But see id. at 297-304 (White, J. dissenting) ("Congress'
silence in its consideration of ... preferential treatment of pregnant workers cannot be
fairly interpreted to abrogate the plain ... language of the statute.").
77 See id. at 283 n.14 (citing legislative history of PDA). "[T]itle VII does not pre-empt
[s]tate laws which would not require violating [T]itle VII." Id.
78 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963). There
must be a demonstrated "impossibility of dual compliance." Id. at 143. An employer can
comply with Title VI's equal opportunity requirements and provide a safe work environment, thus precluding the finding of "impossibility" needed to preempt state tort law. See
id.; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 78 (1987) (refusing to find Indiana
corporation law regulating takeovers preempted by Williams Act). "[I]t is entirely possible
for entities to comply with both the Williams Act and the Indiana Act." Id. at 79. The Court
is not likely to find preemption where dual compliance is less than physically impossible.
See Rotunda, supra note 29, at 317.
71 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208; see also Becker, supra note 11, at 1245. "[Tlhe
lack of firm evidence linking maternal occupational exposure to fetal injury... make[s] ...
causation... difficult to prove." Id. Further, where the employer has complied with government standards, it will be difficult to prove gross negligence. Id.; see also Johnson Controls,
111 S. Ct. at 1208 (noting that liability will be difficult to establish where employer fully
informs woman of known risks and does not act negligently). Indeed, employers' concerns
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entirely possible to promote equal employment opportunities for
women and at the same time create a safe work environment.8 0
Lastly, state tort law will be preempted if it interferes with the
purpose and execution of the objectives of Title VII."1 Although
potential tort liability will increase the costs of employer compliance with Title VII, s2 this additional burden does not directly inhibit the goals of Title VII."3 Furthermore, it is proposed that any
tension created by tort law with Title VII's equal employment
goals is insufficient to preempt state law.8 4 In summary, applicafor increased costs resulting from tort liability appear to be unfounded. Id. "There has yet
to be a single award regarding prenatal injuries from maternal exposure to toxins at the
workplace." Hamlet, supra note 11, at f126. One commentator has suggested that employers' meritless concerns for tort liability may be a pretext for the implementation of exclusionary policies. See Williams, supra note 55, at 646 n.25.
80 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 11, at 1246 n.121 (citing example of company maintaining a safe and nondiscriminatory work environment). Dow Chemical is illustrative of a corporation which has no female exclusionary policies and has succeeded in maintaining safe
fetal exposure levels for all chemicals. See id. (citations omitted). Dow indicated that it
would be reluctant to use a chemical which had "no safe exposure level for fetal toxicity."
Id.
81 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
2 See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209. Congress imposed the requirements of
Title VII upon employers despite the social costs involved. Id.; see also Leading Cases,
supra note 56, at 387 (discussing transitional costs associated with creating integrated
workplace).
83 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963). In CTS Corp., the Supreme Court upheld an
Indiana Law that severely inhibited successful takeovers of Indiana corporations by conditioning takeovers on an approval of a majority of certain shareholders. Id. at 73-74. Respondents claimed the state law was preempted by the Williams Act whose purpose was to impose disclosure requirements on potential buyers and establish rules regulating tender
offers. Id. at 79. The Court recognized that the law would delay takeovers, but reasoned that
this delay was insufficient to warrant its preemption by the Williams Act. Id. at 86.
Florida Lime involved a California statute that imposed a strict maturity standard on
avocados before allowing distribution in the state in contrast to federal marketing requirements which required a lower maturity standard. Id. at 137-38. Despite an apparent conflict
in the two standards, the Court held there was no interference with the federal purpose of
maintaining minimum standards of quality, nor was dual compliance impossible. Id. at 143.
The Court concluded that the California statute was not preempted. Id. at 152.
84 See supra notes 32 & 83 (noting cases exemplifying tension between state and federal law); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (recognizing that
"there is tension between" state and federal law). The punitive damages claim allowed in
Silkwood was premised on tort law's concern of compensating victims of injury. Id. at 255.
This law was found not to be preempted, even where the purpose of the federal statute was
primarily one of safety. Id. at 256. The Court narrowed the objectives of the federal law in
order that state tort action would not satisfy the "actual conflict" requirement for preemption. Id. at 251-52; see also TRIME, supra note 2, at 487 (arguing no preemption where "most
that can be said is that the direction in which state law pushes someone's actions is in
general tension with broad ... goals" of federal law); Rotunda, supra note 29, at 318 ("ob-
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tion of preemption principles and the Court's reluctance to invalidate state statutes indicate that state tort law should not be preempted by Title VII. 6

III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Policy. considerations are often considered in preemption decisions 6 despite many commentators' admonitions.8 s First, respect
for federalism, 8 which favors the upholding of state law, is an important concern.8e The Supreme Court's reluctance to find state
laws preempted" connotes a policy to require Congress to expressly indicate its intent to restrain state power to regulate."1
Second, potential tort liability encourages employers to mainstacles that the state sets up must be fairly high before the Court will infer preemption").
See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., CaliforniaFed., 464 U.S. at 284-85 (examining the policy objectives of Title
VII); Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (recognizing larger policy
objectives of Sherman Act as fostering economic liberty).
"' See TME, supra note 2, § 6-29, at 510. Some courts approach the preemption decision as "essentially one of policy" rather than statutory construction. Id., § 6-29, at 511. The
court's task is one of interpreting, not lawmaking. Id.; see also Hirsch, supra note 1, at 55658 (courts do not acknowledge discretion to define preemption policy); supra note 28.
" See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). "FEDERALISM. Term which includes
interrelationships among the states and relationship between the states and the federal government." Id. "The history of the United States is in large part the story of the American
struggle to define the relationship between the states and the federal government." Jeff
Powell, The Complete Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism,91 YALE L.J. 1317,
1320 (1982); see also New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2418-19 (1992) (federalism
is question of determining "the core of sovereignty retained by the states"). For a historical
perspective on federalism, see GOTTFRIED DiTZE, THE FEDERALIST 269-71 (1960).
" See Cippollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977Y. Courts should be concerned not to upset the "federalstate balance" by finding preemption where it is not warranted. Id.; see also Rotunda, supra
note 29, at 321 (discussing reasons for Supreme Court's reluctance to infer preemption). The
Court's recent decisions refusing to find preemption are "out of a respect for federalism."
Id. This indicates a deference to Congress to make vital decisions affecting the power of the
states. Id.; TRIBE, supra note 2, § 6-26, at 481. Reluctance to infer preemption is consistent
with the courts' decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(holding that the legislative power should restrict state sovereignty).
90 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct 2608 (1992) (deferring to Congress to
clarify its intent concerning preemptive effect of statutes); see also supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
91 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57 (Congress' power under Commerce Clause must respect role of states in federal system); see also Rotunda, supra note 29, at 321 ("more democratic branches of the central government should be preferred to make the primary decisions limiting the power of the states"). Since it is the intent of Congress that guides
preemption decisions, Congress should use exacting language to convey its desired effect. Id.
If the courts interfere with Congress' purpose, Congress is free to reverse. Id.; see ROTUNDA
ET AL., supra note 4, § 12.1, at 624.
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tain safer work environments. 2 Companies will be compelled to
clean up work sites, 93 improve inspection and testing, 94 and educate employees about safety.9 5 Conversely, allowing employers to
escape liability is a disincentive 6 resulting in work environments
that are safe only for men. 7 In fact, before the Court invalidated
fetal protection policies, they were implemented only in male dominated industries, not in "pink collar" areas.9 " Surely Congress did
not intend to achieve equal employment opportunity at the expense of workplace safety.99
92 See Buss, supra note 11, at 591. "[E]mployers will have to improve working conditions.., in order to avoid tort liability." Id. Buss favors a "protective impulse" that serves
safety interests of all employees. Id. "[T]he system of incentives created by the courts will
strongly influence the quality of... [working] conditions in years to come." Id. at 590. This
Note asserts that refusing to preempt employers' state tort liability provides such an incentive to create safer workplaces.
93 Id.

9' Id. at 592-93 (urging enforcement of monitoring and testing requirements under
Toxic Substances Control Act).
95 See Becker, supra note 11, at 1262. Employers are required to give all employees
information about reproductive hazards. See id. at 1241 n.105 (citations omitted).
98 See Buss, supra note 11, at 596. Courts should encourage long term solutions to fetal
hazards. Id. Excluding employers from tort liability is a short-term solution in the same way
that fetal protection policies were. Id.
07 See id. But see Gary Z. Nothstein & Jeffrey P. Ayres, Sex-Based Considerationsof
Differentiation in the Workplace: Exploring the Biomedical Interface Between OSHA and
Title VII, 26 VILL. L. R.V. 239, 243-48 (1980-81). Nothstein and Ayres discuss the technical
effects of toxins on the reproductive organs of each sex. Id. at 244-45. However, they conclude that policies based on an increased susceptibility of women are unsupported. Id. at
246. Several commentators have noted the lack of complete evidence regarding the health
effects of various chemicals. See, e.g., Buss, supranote 11, at 579-80 (noting data concerning
reproductive risks of toxins is limited); Williams, supra note 55, at 660-62 (discussing
problems involved with reliance on existing evidence). Many studies focus only on the effects on women, which results in the implementation of unfair exclusionary policies. See
Becker, supra note 11, at 1235 (arguing fetal protection policies have been implemented
without substantiating evidence); see also Williams, supra note 55, at 660 (proposing that
employers base exclusionary policies on inaccurate stereotype that women are exclusively
subject to transmitting birth defects).
"' See Becker, supra note 11, at 1238-40. In industries that consist primarily of women
workers ("pink collar" industries), exclusionary policies have never been implemented despite the danger of fetal injury. Id. This is so primarily because of the need for female
workers in certain cases. Id. at 1238-39; see also Hamlet, supra note 11, at 1125 (women are
only excluded when they are considered "marginal members of the workforce").
9 See Linda G. Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for
the Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 854-55 (1981). Resolution of the
problem of workplace hazards involves a balance of competing interests that will favor
health and equal employment opportunity. Id. at 854. "[C]ourts should require employers to
reduce the reproductive hazards . . . rather than allow them to circumvent the 'national
policy of equality of employment opportunities." Id. at 854-55; see also Becker, supra note
11, at 1246 (arguing solution to potential tort liability not exclusion of women from
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Third, although "potential tort liability is an added cost of
employing women," 100 eradicating gender discrimination is an important national goal. 10 1 No sound reason exists to require women
and their offspring to bear the cost of promoting equal employment opportunities. 102
The decision not to preempt state law may seem unduly burdensome for employers who, for example, engage in unreasonably
03
dangerous activities that may subject them to strict liability.
However, through legislation,'0' there are several potential alternatives to protect these employers.105 For example, diversification of
the cost of fetal injuries among all employers by restructuring the
workers' compensation system to cover these injuries would result
in an increased cost to the employer but offer a practical long-term
solution.106 Additionally, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
workplace).
100 Becker, supra note 11, at 1247; see also Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209 (acknowledging that employers may be burdened with additional costs).
101 See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. at 1203 (recognizing import of PDA in
prohibiting sex discrimination); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (recognizing that Congress unambiguously prohibited pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination).
12 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678. Employers can pass on the additional cost of fetal
injury liability by increasing the costs of their products. Id., see Hamlet, supra note 11, at
1130 n.100 (citations omitted).
103 See Hamlet, supra note 11, at 1146-47. In certain instances, it is technologically
impossible or too costly to eliminate all hazardous substances from workplace. Id. However,
employers will have to establish that there are no available alternatives to exclusion. See
Williams, supra note 55, at 698-99; see also Hannah A. Furnish, PrenatalExposure to Fatally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA L. REV. 63, 117 (1980) (proposing that employer
has burden to show no reasonable alternatives exist). It seems clear, at least, that where the
employer is negligent in some manner, he will be liable for fetal injuries even where he was
required to offer equal employment opportunities to fertile women. See Johnson Controls,
111 S. Ct. at 1208.
104 See Buss, supra note 11, at 591. Courts are not as qualified as the legislature or an
agency to regulate industries, conduct research and evaluate scientific evidence to formulate
policies. Id. Employers are not equipped to make decisions regarding acceptable fetal protection policies because employer concerns are largely self-serving, despite their apparent
concern for future generations. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1210. Congress is in the
best position to resolve the conflicts because it is a neutral party. See Becker, supra, note
11, at 1264; see also Furnish, supra note 103, at 116 (proposing that legislative solution is
best alternative). Further, women would be able to apply political pressure, to have their
needs addressed. See Becker, supra note 11, at 1264.
101 See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
1I
See Becker, supra note 11, at 1246. Modification of the worker's compensation system is a fair solution that could preclude tort actions against employers and extend existing
rate schedules to include compensation for fetal injuries. Id.
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("OSHA") 10 7 and the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") 0

s

workplaces.10

are intended to promote the maintenance of safe
However, because these statutes are presently ineffective and
poorly enforced, 110 Congress would need to overhaul them"" or create a new statutory framework to replace them."1 2 The aforementioned statutory alternatives would promote equal opportunity and
safer work environments without shifting the cost entirely to
women and their families. 13 Until such revised legislation is implemented, courts should allow the institution of state tort actions
against employers.
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
1o- 15 U.S.C. §§ 2602-29 (1988).
100 See Hamlet, supra note 11, at 1144. The purpose of both of these Acts was to estab10M 29

lish safe work environment standards. Id. OSHA is directed towards maintaining acceptable
standards for safe workplaces. See Furnish, supra note 103, at 67. It authorizes the establishment of feasible standards with a view to preventing worker health problems due to
exposure to certain hazards. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988). OSHA also has a broad provision which requires employers to "furnish to ... employees.., a place of employment...
free from recognized hazards that.., cause death or serious physical harm." Id. § 654(a)(1)
(1988). See generally Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 97, at 264-99 (discussing sex-based
considerations under OSHA framework).
The TSCA is primarily concerned with the regulation of the use of toxic substances.
See Buss, supra note 11, at 593. It requires employer testing of chemicals used or produced
in the work site and approval of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") who is
charged with implementation and enforcement of regulations concerning the use of these
chemicals. See 15 U.S.C. § 4(b)(3)(b) (1976); id. § 2603(b)(3) & (c) (1988). See generally
Buss, supra note 11, at 592-95 (discussing the framework of TSCA and appropriateness as
regulatory legislation in area of fetal hazards).
110 See Hamlet, supra note 11, at 1144-45. "Both OSHA and the TSCA have met with
limited success in effectively regulating toxic exposure for workers." Id. OSHA appears
hopelessly inadequate to deal with fetal protection issues. Id. at 1145. Furthermore, case law
has diluted any import of OSHA by establishing minimal standards and not forcing economically infeasible standards upon employers. See Nothstein and Ayres, supra note 97, at 27480.
' See Hamlet, supra note 11, at 1144. "Ideally, OSHA and the EPA (as empowered by
the TSCA) should pass tougher regulations and vigorously enforce both new and existing
standards." Id. at 1147.
' See id. at 1146-50 (proposing new statute). One suggestion is a proposed statutory
scheme that would, among other things, protect the rights of workers to make informed
decisions. Id. Another alternative is the creation of a damage fund in which industries would
contribute to a pool that would pay injured parties. Id. at 1127. A third alternative urges the
creation of a compensation system that would give women excluded from certain jobs priority in other non-hazardous positions, disability coverage during pregnancy in the event they
have to give up their position, and reinstatement after pregnancy. See Becker, supra note
11, at 1265-66.
"I See Becker, supra note 11, at 1266. The costs of fetal safety should not be
shouldered entirely by women. Id. at 1247. This alternative legislation would not result in
"an advantage for men and a disadvantage for women." Id. at 1266.

19931

PREEMPTION REVISITED

1065

CONCLUSION

"The division of [American] government, while simple in theory, frequently presents pradtical complexities which... [are] difficult to harmonize. ' 114 The difficult preemption question presented
by Johnson Controls will have resounding implications for the labor world. Courts should adhere to established preemption doctrine and hesitate to invalidate state law in the absence of a real
conflict. In considering policy, courts should strive for a decision
that will achieve the goals of both Title VII and state tort law.
Preemption of state tort law is not the solution to workplace
hazards. Refusing to preempt state tort liability and leaving to
Congress the task of finding a permanent solution will promote a
safer and more equitable workplace.
Leta L. Fishman

114

People v. Daly, 105 N.E. 1048, 1050 (N.Y. 1914).

